Abstract. Classi¯cation is one of the major tasks in data mining which aims to build classi¯ers for decision making. One of the most recent online threats is phishing, which has caused signi¯cant losses to online shoppers, electronic businesses and¯nancial institutions. A common way of phishing is impersonating online websites to deceive online users and steal their¯nancial information. One way to guide the anti-phishing classi¯cation method is to preliminarily identify a minimal set of related features so the search space can be reduced. The aim of this paper is to compare di®erent features assessment techniques in the website phishing context in order to determine the minimal set of features for detecting phishing activities. Experimental results on real phishing datasets consisting of 30 features has been conducted using three known features selection methods. New features cuto®s have been identi¯ed after statistical analysis utilising three data mining classi¯cation methods. We have been able to identify new clusters of features that when used together are able to detect phishing activities. Further, important correlations among common features have been derived.
Introduction
The Internet has become an essential component of our everyday life activities. It is not only vital for individual users, but also for businesses that o®er online trading so they can achieve a competitive edge by serving more clients. The Internet facilitates reaching customers all over the globe without any marketplace restrictions and with e®ective use of electronic and mobile commerce. Hundreds of millions of dollars are transferred through the World Wide Web daily by businesses and users (Abdelhamid et al., 2014) . These large numbers of¯nancial transactions are tempting fraudsters to carry out deceitful operations. Hence, online and mobile users may be vulnerable to di®erent types of web threats, which may cause¯nancial damage, identity theft, loss of private information, brand reputation damage and loss of customers' con¯dence in online trading (Mohammad et al., 2014) . Therefore, users demand safer websites and electronic payment systems to secure their¯nancial transactions.
Phishing is considered a form of web threat that is de¯ned as the art of impersonating a website of an honest enterprise aiming to obtain users' private information such as usernames, passwords and social security numbers. Presumably, these fake websites have high visual similarities to the authentic ones. Common techniques of phishing are based on social engineering and are commonly combined with technical tricks together in order to initialise an online attack. Typically, a website phishing attack starts by an email that seems authentic to potential online victims asking them to update or validate their information by following a URL link within the email (Mohammad et al., 2012) . Stopping phishing attacks during the preliminary stages is a crucial step towards a secure online space. The Internet community has devoted tremendous e®orts into creating defensive measures against phishing. However, the problem is continuously evolving and becomes more complicated since new deceptive methods appear day after day. Therefore, an intelligent anti-phishing solution based around data mining or machine learning is constantly needed to di®er-entiate among websites types.
The number of available features that can be linked with a website are massive (Basnet et al., 2012; Thabtah and Abdelhamid, 2016) . This is since there are large numbers of features that may relate to the URL, domain, source code, etc. One primary challenge in minimising the phishing problem is to identify the smallest set of features before intelligently classifying the website as phishing or legitimate (Zuhir et al., 2015) . This problem may cause deterioration in the predictive accuracy especially when many irrelevant features are kept in the dataset. These irrelevant features increase the search space for the intelligent method during building the classi¯er and may also participate in several useless rules (Thabtah and Hammoud, 2013) . Furthermore, the search space for n features in the training dataset may reach 2 n À 1 di®erent non-empty subsets. This indeed may trigger the intelligent algorithm to fail during feature processing from the data (Hadi et al., 2007; Thabtah and Abdelhamid, 2016) .
In this paper, we investigate di®erent feature¯ltering methods aiming to decide on a small set of features' set that can help the intelligent algorithm to classify websites. The research question that we seek to answer is \Can we identify clusters of features that detect phishing from a large collection of features?" These cuto® points can help the decision-maker in di®erentiating between features' integrity and may serve as a¯ne line among clusters of similar features. To elaborate further, we seek to identify di®erent versions or combinations for feature's clusters that may originate from the results obtained by the three¯ltering methods. The aim is directed towards websites' features, that when chosen can improve the predictive power of the rule-based classi¯cation data mining models for the website phishing problem. The reasons behind our selection of rule-based classi¯cation are:
. The simplicity of the resulting classi¯ers: interpretable rules that most decisionmakers can understand . Highly predictive accuracy classi¯ers
The features' evaluation has been conducted based on applying three¯ltering methods on a dataset that contains large numbers of website's features. The¯ltering methods are: Correlation Features Set (CFS) (Hall, 1999) , Chi-Square (Liu and Setiono, 1995) and Information Gain (IG) (Quinlan, 1993) , and are contrasted against the dataset of 30 features (Mohammad et al., 2015) . We have selected these three¯ltering methods since they are well known for their e®ectiveness in preprocessing large data applications such as text and web mining (Uysal, 2016) . We have utilised three data mining classi¯cation algorithms in the experimental analysis of the features' goodness and these are: C4.5 (Quinlan, 1993) , PART (Frank and Witten, 1998) and RIPPER (Cohen, 1995) . These classi¯cation algorithms have been used to measure the impact with reference to accuracy of¯ltering methods on di®erent features' clusters derived from the original dataset.
The paper is structured as follows: a literature review on website phishing is presented in Sec. 2. The feature selection methods are discussed in Sec. 3. Section 4 discusses the experimental settings and Sec. 5 is devoted to results and analysis using feature selection and classi¯cation methods. Lastly, we conclude and highlight areas for future research in Sec. 6.
Literature Review
Attributes selection methods have been proposed primarily for two reasons according to (Abdelhamid et al., 2014): (1) Reduce the search space by removing irrelevant attributes so that: (a) Only interrelated attributes with the class label are selected. (b) The intelligent algorithm is able to come up with results based on the available computing resources. This often happens when we have massive numbers of attributes in the input dataset.
(2) To enhance the predictive power of the classi¯ers in supervised learning.
There is a large body of research which has been conducted on attributes selection techniques in the machine learning and data mining research especially in domain applications like text categorisation, bioinformatics and web mining (Uysal, 2016) . In this section, we review and critically analyse di®erent recent research related tō ltering techniques in website phishing. Therefore, papers related to¯ltering techniques used in other applications have been excluded in this research study.
A comparative study on phishing websites using a number of features selection methods has been conducted (Zuhir et al., 2015) . Four feature selection methods have been compared, predominantly IG, Chi-Square and Wrapper-based Feature Selection (WFS) on three previously collected datasets from the Phishtank (https://www.phishtank.com/) repository. The authors used 58 URL features that have been gathered from di®erent papers (Uzun et al., 2013) and no features analyses have been provided in the paper nor a proper justi¯cation on why these features have been chosen. Two tests have been organised using four machine learning algorithms (two decision trees; Naïve Bayes, Support Vector Machine) and using various evaluation techniques. The results varied according to the prediction accuracy and robustness per dataset. Some features have been detected with high signi¯cance among all¯ltering methods. The authors concluded that there is no particular features¯ltering method that¯ts all classi¯cations algorithms in terms of predictive performance. In addition, other factors related to the input data domain, available attributes and the classi¯cation algorithm used are a®ecting performance. Qabajeh and Thabtah (2014) have investigated di®erent¯ltering methods for email phishing data in order to determine a small set of features, usually fewer than 9, that can be used as a¯ne dataset for phishing detection. They have studied CFS, IG and Chi-Square's e®ect on 47 features using rule-based classi¯cation in data mining. Two types of tests have been conducted:
(1) Complete dataset of 47 features.
(2) Minimal dataset after applying the¯ltering methods considered.
After experimentations, the¯ltering methods showed consistency 12 common features. These features have further been tested to measure their sensitivity to the classi¯cation accuracy on the data. The results revealed that the 12 features chosen have achieved highly competitive results when contrasted with the results obtained on the entire data. This led to a signi¯cant¯nding: that a¯ltering process may positively a®ect classi¯cation accuracy in some cases especially in the case of a phishing classi¯cation problem. No statistical analysis has been conducted on determining what distinguishes features' goodness/signi¯cance.
Sixteen di®erent website's features have been evaluated in associative classi¯ca-tion using over 1500 data examples that have been gathered from Yahoo directory and Phishtank (Abdelhamid et al., 2013) . The authors have preprocessed the dataset using Chi-Square before applying an associative classi¯cation algorithm named MCAC on the reduced subset dataset. During the features¯ltering, nine features have been identi¯ed as relevant to the phishing detection rate and these have a direct impact on the MCAC classi¯cation performance. An extension of this study was performed in 2014 (Abdelhamid et al., 2014) where the author concluded that the predictive performance in associative classi¯cation may not be impacted when using the nine features described in the 2013 study, since the classi¯ers derived from two associative classi¯cation algorithms have sustainable performance with reference to accuracy on the same utilised dataset.
A large collection of websites' features has been investigated to identify the minimal set of features that contribute to phishing (Basnet et al., 2012) . The authors have collected large features' sets from previous research and used Phishtank in order to evaluate two¯ltering methods -WFS and CFS. Three data mining algorithms named Logistic Regression, Naïve Bayes, and Random Forests classi¯ers have been used to assess the¯ltering methods' performances on phishing datasets. The classi¯cation accuracy of the classi¯ers generated by the data mining algorithms has been recorded for two scenarios:
. Before applying the¯ltering methods, . After applying the¯ltering methods.
The WFS¯ltering method showed competitive classi¯cation accuracy measures when used before applying the three considered data mining algorithms and produced better accuracy than CFS. The best combination results have been achieved using both WFS with the Random Forest algorithm. Mohammad et al. (2012) studied di®erent websites characteristics to di®erentiate among legitimate and fraudulent websites. The aim was to explore di®erent website's features by automatically collecting them using a PHP script from websites rather than relying on human experience rules for the features' goodness in determining the type of website. The study consisted of over 2400 websites collected from Yahoo directory, Millersmiles (www.millersmiles.co.uk) and Phishtank along with 16 features such as IP address, Pre¯x, Su±x, URL length, Web tra±c, etc. The authors have used simple frequency analysis for each feature and created a table that consists of each feature's frequency based on the collected websites dataset. The results of IG after frequency analysis indicated that there is no¯ne subset that could be best for the classi¯cation algorithms. Therefore, it is better to utilise the entire features' set when it comes to classifying websites to either phishing or legitimate categories.
The Feature Selection Methods Considered
Feature or attribute selection is the process of assessing a large number of attributes in business domain data in order to choose a subset that serves as a good representation of the entire data. Often, this subset of attributes should be enough to derive similar evaluation performances as the entire data attributes. Thus¯ltering methods can be seen as a useful tool particularly when the possible number of attributes is massive in which existing learning methods will be unable to search the entire data space (Uzun et al., 2013) . There are large numbers of attribute selection methods such as IG (Quinlan, 1993) , Minimum Redundancy and Maximum Relevance (MRMR) (Peng et al., 2005) , CFS (Hall, 1999) and others. For instance, IG uses Entropy to evaluate the goodness of an attribute. Whereas MRMR ensures a computed score per feature based on decrementing the feature's predictive power (relevancy to the class) from its similarity to other existing features.
We discuss in this section three primary attribute selection methods from the literature that we consider in this paper. In particular, Chi-Square, CFS and IG are examined besides their mathematical interpretations. The primary reason for choosing these three attribute selection methods is the fact that they have been employed successfully in di®erent classi¯cation domains including text categorisation, email classi¯cation and medical applications (Uysal, 2016) . Below is a description of the three¯ltering methods.
3.1. Correlation-based feature's subset CFS was developed as a search method to¯lter out datasets attributes by selecting a subset that contains useful attributes when associated with the class label (Hall, 1999) . The usefulness of a speci¯c attribute in the dataset is measured based on its correlation with the class as described in Eq. (1). CFS also takes into account the correlation among the attributes themselves. Equation (1) is also called Person's correlation in which all variables are standardised. The aim of this¯ltering method is to choose the attributes that have high correlation with the class and less correlation with each other so the error rate can be reduced on the resulting classi¯ers.
where r zc is the search method for p the data attributes, r zi is the mean attribute and class correlation, and r ii is the average attribute-attribute correlation.
Information gain
IG is one of the known methods that has been used as a learning mechanism in decision trees (Quinlan, 1993) and as a pre-processing method in machine learning applications such as text categorisation (Uysal, 2016) . IG has been utilised in decision trees classi¯cation to measure the reduction of the degree of uncertainty when an attribute can determine a speci¯c class label. In other words, it measures how informative an attribute is in determining the value of the class label using Eqs. (2) and (3). IG evaluates how a speci¯c attribute splits the input data examples with respect to the available set of class labels. Given an input dataset D of P outcomes, for each attribute X is possible to calculate its entropy as:
where pðx i Þ is the probability that x belongs to class c. The IG of attribute X in the input data (D) is
where D is input data, Dx is the subset of D for which X has value x, jDxj ¼ the subset data size having Dx from D, jDj ¼ the input data size.
Chi-Square
In 1995, Liu and Setiono (1995) disseminated a mathematical search method for supervised classi¯cation named Chi-Square in which the values for a continuous attribute in a dataset are¯rstly ranked inside an interval. The procedure then evaluates the relative frequencies of the class labels in the intervals with respect to the attribute's value using Eq. (4). A common example to test the correlations between attributes and class labels is the application of text categorisation where each term's (keyword) correlation with the available categories (class labels) is computed:
where
where C is the number of available class labels, A ij is the number of data examples in the ith interval with class j, R i is the number of data examples in the ith interval, C j is the number of data examples of class j in the two intervals, N is size of data examples in the two intervals, and E ij is the expected frequency of A ij ¼ R i Â C j =N.
Experimental Settings
There are huge numbers of features that are associated with a webpage and many of these can be utilised to identify fraudulent websites from legitimate ones including URL length, pre¯x, @ symbol, IP address, and others. Several scholars in the research area of computer security who are interested in phishing have studied the di®erent webpage features. Examples of those are Zuhir et al. (2015) , etc. We have identi¯ed 30 features based on recent studies done, i.e. Abdelhamid et al. (2014) . One of the major obstacles faced by scholars in the phishing security domain is the scarcity of reliable datasets that can be used to measure the performance of phishing detection methods especially the classi¯cation problem of website phishing. Despite the progression of research projects related to website phishing classi¯cation-based data mining in the last few years, common agreement on a certain website's feature set is still to be reached. This means coming up with a complete website's features dataset is a challenging task. Only recently has there been a security dataset developed which is related to phishing. This development occurred after an evaluation of the literature on website's features related to this problem (Mohammad et al., 2015) . We have used this recently published phishing data in our experiments as well as statistically analysing its features.
The security dataset consists of over 2000 website instances and 30 di®erent features (attributes). Most of the attributes take the form of binary or ternary possible values. The dataset is considered a binary classi¯cation since the class label attribute has only two distinct values (Phishing, Legitimate) which are denoted \À1" and \1" respectively. The data was collected and evaluated based on features disseminated in research papers in the past¯ve years. The data instances have been collected from Yahoo directory and Phishtank repositories.
We conducted experimentations against the security data described above. In particular, three feature selection methods reviewed in Sec. 3 were applied to the dataset to determine signi¯cant features cuto®s that may have helped in clustering the features into relevant sets. We wanted to¯nd highly correlated feature's sets which may help in detecting phishing activities. The feature selection methods that have been compared are CFS, Chi-Square and IG. The reason behind our selection of these three¯ltering methods are:
(1) They often produce signi¯cant features in multiple application domains such as text mining and bioinformatics. (2) They have proven feature's goodness in email phishing classi¯cation data.
Once features are¯ltered out after applying the feature selection methods, three rule classi¯cation-based data mining algorithms are trained on the di®erent sets of features. The reason for utilising the classi¯cation algorithms is to measure the increase or decrease of the phishing detection rate when compared with the rate generated from the original dataset. In other words, we would like to measure the performance results of the feature selection methods in the context of the error rate generated by the classi¯cation algorithms on a number of versions of the phishing dataset. More signi¯cantly, the key feature(s) that have a larger impact on the phishing detection rate need to be identi¯ed. This may lead us to a reduction in the search space in the original dataset (fewer number of features) and enable e±cient training for the data mining algorithm without deteriorating the overall error rate of the resulting classi¯ers.
In the experiments, we have chosen RIPPER (Cohen, 1995) , PART (Frank and Witten, 1998) and C4.5 (Quinlan, 1993 ) algorithms since they often generate simple yet highly accurate rule-based classi¯ers. We assessed the complete data features and other smaller feature's sets (versions) based on the obtained results of (IG, CFS, ChiSquare) on the original dataset. Furthermore, the experiments also involved investigating the classi¯ers produced by the data mining algorithms before and after applying feature selection methods. Questions arose such as:
(1) What are the most signi¯cant features in phishing classi¯cation? (2) How many cuto® points can we have after applying IG and Chi-Square? (3) What are the relevant features' sets which can be produced from the complete dataset? (4) How are classi¯er error rates and number of rules (correlations discovered) impacted when a smaller set of features are used to train the data mining algorithms?
The answers of the above questions and others can help security experts as well as computational scientists in improving the design process of anti-phishing security models. All experiments have been conducted using the WEKA (WEKA, 2011) software tool. WEKA is the acronym for Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis. It is an open source Java-based data mining software that has been designed and implemented at The University of Waikato in New Zealand and it contains di®erent implementations for data mining and¯ltering methods. Ten-fold cross validation testing method has been used in the training RIPPER, PART and C4.5 in order to produce the classi¯ers from the phishing dataset. Lastly, all experiments have been run on a computing machine with 2.5 Ghz processor. The three feature selection methods (IG, CFS, Chi-Square) are built within WEKA.
Results and Analysis
In this section, we show the results obtained in di®erent experiments and critically analyse them. The description of each experiment is give below:
In this experiment, the complete features' set of the data is evaluated using the data mining algorithms. We would like to evaluate the predictive power of the classi¯ers derived from the entire dataset.
(B) IG, Chi-Square and CFS experiments
The 30 features dataset has been evaluated using the considered feature selection methods. In this experiment, we show each feature's score after applying the three feature selection methods.
(C) Cuto®s features experiment(s)
A deep analysis of the feature assessment results will be conducted aiming to specify the cuto® points that split the features' set. We believe that each cuto® point can di®erentiate among two features' sets (a measure of feature's goodness). In doing so, we seek to derive the best features identi¯ed by Chi-Square and IG methods. In this experiment, we identify discrepancies between features' scores aiming to¯nd the sharp line that di®erentiates high impact features from low impact ones on the phishing dataset.
The results obtained from applying IG, Chi-Square and CFS on the 30 features dataset are depicted in Table 1 . For each method we have recorded the feature name, the feature's actual score (if derived) and the feature's rank. For example, in the¯rst row of Table 1 , \having IP Address" feature has the rank 13 in both Chi-Square and IG with 0.006 and 98 scores respectively. The features' scores are generated and represented in di®erent ways by IG and Chi-Square methods and using its original mathematical formula as described earlier in Sec. 3.
After analysing Table 1 , it is obvious that there is high correlation between the scores generated by the Chi-Square and IG feature selection methods particularly in ranking the features of the phishing dataset. In particular, the top-ranked features in both assessment methods are the same. Further, very high similarity even occurs in the rank position for the rest of the features as shown in Table 1 .
One notable result in that table is that both IG and Chi-Square features scores show a drastic drop on a number of occasions. In particular, the discrepancies are obvious among: These four cuto® points can be utilised to distinguish among features' sets according to relevance. This can be considered a¯ne line that di®erentiates highly good features from normal features. All features preceding the cuto® point can be used as a features' set or a cluster. In this paper, we have estimated that a cuto® point is established when:
(1) The di®erence in scores between two successive features is >50%. This 50% is the amount in scores dropping between two consecutive features in rank using IG and Chi-Square. (2) The 50% drop occurred between two features associated with any score larger than the normally accepted scores by IG and Chi-Square methods. The accepted threshold in Chi-Square is any feature's score >¼ 10:83 (Setiono and Liu, 1995) . The threshold in IG varies but we have selected any feature's score > 0.01. Therefore, the cuto® point between features ranked #24 and #25 has been discarded since these two features show scores below the normal accepted scores of IG and Chi-Square methods.
To elaborate further on the cuto® point that de¯nes features' goodness in phishing, we have computed the di®erence in scores for Chi-Square and IG for the 30 features dataset as shown in Table 2 . We also show the decrement rate in % between each two successive features in a top-down fashion starting from feature ranked #1 up to feature ranked #30. In other words, we computed the decrement rate between two successive features (feature i and feature j where i < j) according to
where Score i is the score of feature i and Score j is the score of feature j, feature i precedes feature j. It is clear from Table 2 that there are multiple cuto® points that have substantial decrement rates between two successive features' ranks. The rates highlighted in red in Table 2 can be considered breaking points that may distinguish features performance. These cuto® points result in the following possible features' sets:
(1) 2-feature set: It contains features ranked #1 and #2 (SSL¯nal State, URL of Anchor). Both IG and Chi-Square have these two features with the same rank. (2) 5-feature set: SSL¯nal State, URL of Anchor, Pre¯x Su±x, web tra±c, having Sub Domain. (3) 9-feature set: SSL¯nal State, URL of Anchor, Pre¯x Su±x, web tra±c, having Sub Domain, Links in tags, Request URL, SFH, Domain registeration length.
The feature's sets show consistency between IG and Chi-Square feature assessment methods in identifying similar good quality features, which provide high con¯dence in the generated results. In addition, the CFS method has also shown nine¯ne features' set which supports our¯ndings of IG and Chi-Square best nine features. The breaking point between \Port" and \Redirect" features for both IG and Chi-Square methods has been ignored since the scores of the two successive features have not reached the minimum required accepted scores for both methods. The cuto®s determined in our analysis show a promising direction toward's di®erentiating between features' goodness in phishing when using results obtain from di®erent feature selection methods. The impact of¯ltering methods on classi¯cation accuracy derived by data mining classi¯ers has been investigated. Figure 1 shows the classi¯cation performance in terms of error rate for C4.5, PART and RIPPER algorithms on the complete features' set and the feature's clusters resulted from the cuto® points (9 features, 5 features, 2 features). The classi¯ers generated by PART algorithm have shown consistency in smaller error rates than the remaining classi¯ers (C4.5, RIPPER). In particular, and for the 30-feature dataset, PART has generated a higher predictive classi¯er by 1.75% and 0.89% than RIPPER and C4.5 algorithms respectively. In addition, PART has a smaller error rate by 0.7% and 0.03% than RIPPER and C4.5 algorithms on the top 9 features. For the 5-feature set, PART achieved 0.31% and 0.1% less error rate than C4.5 and RIPPER respectively. We have looked at the di®erence between the error rates derived by PART's classi¯ers on the di®erent features' sets (30, 9, 5, 2). We found out that classi¯ers' error rate has slightly increased by 2.42%, 3.49% and 5.5% from the 9-feature, 5-feature and 2-feature datasets respectively when compared with the complete dataset (30 features). In fact, when only two features have been used the classi¯-cation accuracy derived by PART was 91.26% which is an acceptable rate. This indeed proves the signi¯cance of the two features selected by the results analysis conducted and shared by the three¯ltering methods. For the 2-feature set, all classi¯cation algorithms have identical error rate performance.
The results obtained so far using the di®erent features selection methods show consistency. For instance, the di®erence in the error rate obtained by the three classi¯cation algorithms from the complete 30 features and the top-ranked 9-feature set are 2.42%, 1.56% and 1.37% for PART, C4.5 and RIPPER algorithms respectively. These results revealed that despite using 9-feature set the phishing detection rate has still not drastically deteriorated. In fact, having a small 1%-2% error in an exchange of smaller classi¯er and less data dimension space may improve the training phase e±-ciency. Additionally, the decision-maker may have control over a smaller classi¯er. Figure 2 depicts the number of rules produced by the classi¯cation algorithms on the di®erent features' set used. For instance, when the 9-feature set has been used the classi¯er derived by RIPPER algorithm contains 14 rules. The same algorithm produced a classi¯er with 29 rules when the 30-feature's dataset has been mined. This means a little over double the size classi¯er with a gain of 1.37% better predictive accuracy rate. In addition, when RIPPER is applied on the smallest feature's set (2-feature), the classi¯er produced contains only the following four rules:
(1) (URL of Anchor ¼ À1) ¼> Class ¼ Phishing, (2) with an error rate increase of only 2.38% and 3.75% when compared to those produced by the top 9-feature and the 30-feature datasets. This indeed shows smaller classi¯ers with slight deterioration of error rate yet this is controllable and easy to maintain by decision-makers. Figure 2 clearly shows that the more features we have the more rules are generated and this is simply because more correlations may usually exist among features. C4.5 usually generates larger classi¯ers followed by PART and then RIPPER. The main reason for C4.5 and PART inducing more rules is the fact that both of them utilise Entropy as a rule induction methodology during the training phase. So when an attribute (feature) with multiple values exists, more branches are built in the tree in which each path from the root to the leaf node denotes a rule. On the other hand, RIPPER is a greedy algorithm that uses multiple rule pruning in both training and classi¯er construction phases. This explains its small sized classi¯ers. To further investigate the features' goodness, Fig. 3 illustrates the error rate produced by the three classi¯cation algorithms on the lowest-ranked 21 features. The Fig. 4 depicts the number of rules generated by the classi¯cation algorithms against the lowest-ranked 21 features. Surprisingly, more rules are produced by PART and C4.5 algorithms than mining all features' sets including the 30-feature dataset. This unexpected result is for two reasons:
(1) More attributes often lead to more correlations and therefore more rules. This has been untrue when we compare the number of rules generated by C4.5 and PART from the 30-feature dataset and the lowest-ranked 21 features. (2) More rules usually increase the classi¯cation accuracy.
Conclusions
Identifying a minimal set of webpage features to guide anti-phishing techniques in classifying websites is a crucial task in computer security due to the large numbers of available features. Several promising features have been proposed by security scholars to substantially improve phishing detection rates. Yet, one of the major challenges faced by experts is to draw¯ne lines that distinguish useful features from useless ones, at least within the context of website classi¯cation problem. In this paper, the e®ect of three common feature assessment methods on website phishing classi¯cation has been investigated. In particular, CFS, IG and Chi-Square methods have been applied on a large collection of features related to websites aiming to determine common similarities and dissimilarities among these methods in the context of features. Three classi¯cation data mining algorithms were then trained on di®erent features' sets identi¯ed by the selection methods so classi¯ers' performance could be measured in terms of predictive accuracy. We have used RIPPER, C4.5 and PART for the task of constructing classi¯ers from the di®erent features' sets. Initial results of features assessment methods revealed that there are three major cuto® points that di®erentiate signi¯cant and insigni¯cant features. These cuto® points have been determined since IG and Chi-Square showed a substantial drop in two successive feature's scores. This has led us to form three possible clusters of features from the original 30-feature set:
. 2-feature dataset, . 5-feature dataset, . 9-feature dataset.
The performance results of the data mining algorithms on these clusters of features have slightly dropped when compared with the results obtained against the complete 30-feature dataset. Speci¯cally, a 1.27%, 2.05% and 2.73% drop of accuracy has resulted from 9-feature, 5-feature and 2-feature clusters respectively when compared with the 30-feature dataset accuracy results for RIPPER algorithm. The decision tree (C4.5) and PART algorithm have generated consistent results on the same feature's clusters. This is surely a good sign of the methodology employed to identify the¯ne lines of features' goodness in the context of the results obtained from the feature selection methods. We have also examined the dataset of 21 features other than the common 9 features identi¯ed by the three feature assessment methods. Results on the classi¯cation algorithms dropped signi¯cantly and over 20% in accuracy which proves the substantiality of the features' clusters that have been discovered according to the mathematical analysis conducted. Overall, there was consistency on the detection rate performance by the considered classi¯cation algorithms against the di®erent features' clusters. The results indeed reveal that there are 21 features that have very limited e®ect on detecting phishing websites. In the near future, we will explore developing a new evaluation measure in phishing that combines the scores of IG and Chi-Squarē ltering methods.
